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LEGAL NARRATIVES, THERAPEUTIC 
NARRATIVES: THE INVISIBILITY AND 
OMNIPRESEN CE OF 
RACE AND GENDER 
Leslie G. Espinoza* 
My first introduction to Denise Gray was through a fonn.1 The 
intake sheet was dated October 17, 1994. The legal problem was 
straightforward: 
Divorce. Married 7 years. Has lived with H [husband] on and off for 
15 years. Two children from H born out of wedlock. Clt [client] mar­
ried in Belmont, MA. Clt has children. H has not been living at 
home since Dec 1993 when clt found out from 12-yr-old daughter that 
H was sexually abusing her for the past 2 months. Clt got a temp 
TRO in Middlesex Probate Ct right away and an extension good til 
Dec 1994. TRO states H can't be alone w/daughter and can't be 
either physically or verbally abusive to Clt and children. DSS [De­
partment of Social Services] filed a formal complaint in Dec 1993 but 
Clt and daughter did not want to press charges so matter was left at 
that. H supposed to attend "sex offenders" meetings and has not. H 
living w/another woman who is pregnant by him. Clt was hoping H 
got necessary help so he would come back and the family would be 
reunited. H doesn't pay support. W [wife] working til Aug 94. No 
court orders governing custody, support or visitation. Clt needs ad­
vice on all. Note: will probably have DPW [Department of Public 
Welfare] case soon.2 
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College. B.A. 1974, University of Red­
lands; J.D. 1977, Harvard. - Ed. I want to thank Boston College Law School for research 
support and Ms. Lisa Orube for remarkable research assistance. Fmally, I owe a debt to 
"Denise Gray" and all of her student attorneys; they brought honesty and courage to the 
troubling challenge of using the courts to sort out people's lives. 
1. This article is based on interlocking narratives, all told from my perspective. I take the 
liberty to include my perception of factual events, feelings, and causes. See Melissa Harrison 
& Margaret E. Montoya, Law Teaching in the Borderlands: "The Mind Knowing Doesn't 
Always Make A Difference That Matters," 5 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 1996) 
(exploring the difficulties of recounting the "story" of a law case, including interpretive diffi­
culties: "How many of our clients would recognize their stories in the legal narratives we 
construct for them? How many of our clients would recognize themselves as we construct 
them as clients?"). This writing is most distinctly my narrative, written from the shifting 
ground of my many identities, including teacher of legal theory, supervising attorney, lawyer, 
scholar; and the intertwining of professional identity with personal identity. See Leslie G. 
Espinoza, Multi-Identity: Community and Culture, 2 VA. J. Soc. POLY. & L. 23, 26-27 (1994). 
2. This is the exact phrasing of the intake sheet, including the abbreviations commonly 
used in legal practice (e.g., "Cit," "W," "H"). 
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My introduction to Denise Gray would come much later. I am a 
clinical law professor.3 The clinic, Boston College Legal Assistance 
Bureau, is known as "LAB."4 I teach students law by supervising 
them as they represent, usually for the first time, a real person with 
real problems.s 
Denise's case was assigned to my case docket.6 I reread the in­
take sheet. The top of the form gave me Denise's name, address, 
3. See generally Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and 
Clinical Education, 15 MINN. L. REv. 1599, 1618-19 (1991) (describing the "outsider" status 
of clinical educators); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on 
Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REv. 577, 589-610 (1987) (describing clinical education and 
particularly noting the problematic nature of the theory-practice label in legal education). 
For a historical perspective on clinical education, see John M. Ferren, Goals, Models and 
Prospects for Clinical-Legal Education, in CLlNICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF 
THE FUTURE 94, 94-96 (Edmund W. Kitch ed., 1970). 
4. LAB is primarily funded by Boston College Law School. It is also a branch of legal 
services in the Boston area and receives limited funding from Legal Services Corporation 
(LSC). Until the summer of 1996, LAB was a part of Greater Boston Legal Services. In 
1996, Congress placed significant restrictions on legal entities receiving funds from LSC. See 
Naftali Bendavid, LSC Cuts Hit Home, Nationwide, AM. LAW., Feb. 19, 1996, at 8 (stating 
that conservatives triumphed in cutting LSC budget to $278 million and forbidding class ac­
tion suits, lobbying, and representation of undocumented immigrants); Indira A.R. 
Lakshrnanan, Curbs Near in Legal Aid for the Poor; U.S. Budget Accord Could Limit Class­
Action Suits, Other Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 1996, at 1, 9 (describing the impact of 
White House-GOP budget compromise that eliminated funding for special programs for mi­
grant workers, Native Americans, and a number of national legal aid centers and estimating 
that 300 offices will be closed, resulting in 500,000 annual clients being turned away); Chances 
for Poor to Sue Clipped By Legal-Aid Cuts, PHOENIX GAZETTE, July 19, 1996, at B6 (report­
ing that Congress cut 30% from 1995's $400 million legal aid budget to $278 million and 
restricted types of suits by, for example, prohibiting Legal Aid attorneys from filing class 
action suits or representing prisoners). Greater Boston Legal Services opted not to take LSC 
money because of the restrictions on the types of clients that could be served, the types of 
actions that could be brought, and the types of remedies that could be sought. Instead, the 
Volunteer Lawyers Project now receives LSC money for provision of legal services to the 
poor in the Boston area. LAB now receives LSC money from the Volunteer Lawyers Project 
and is operating under all the restrictions that are concomitant with LSC money. 
5. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical 
Education as Methodology, in CLlNICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW . STUDENT 374, 383-84 
(1973). Professor Goldfarb explains the important difference in . this method of learning: 
"Confronting [a real-life legal problem], clinicians believe, brings the values at stake and the 
potential consequences of various courses of action into sharp relief . • • •  Experience strength­
ens the motivation for inquiry, enlivens the critical issues, and provides a sound basis for 
examination and analysis." Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1615. 
6. Our process for representing any particular client is like most legal services offices. 
The person seeking services calls the office and speaks to the intake worker. The intake 
worker fills out a form, which provides basic information about the person calling and de­
scribes the presenting legal problem. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law 
Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107, 2111-13 (1991); Carl J. 
Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What ls Going To 
Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PRoBs. 599 (1979) (describing legal 
services intake process). The supervising attorneys and social worker at LAB meet twice a 
week with the intake worker to review requests for se�ices. If a person requesting service is 
selected at that meeting, she is asked to come in for an.interview with a student attorney. 
After the interview, the supervisor and the student attorney determine if LAB will represent 
the person. See Alfieri, supra, at 2112 (an example of the standard legal services approach). 
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and telephone number. It named her husband, Robert Gray, as the 
opposing party; his address was listed as unknown. Denise was 44, 
not deaf, and not in need of an interpreter. I assigned the case to 
Alisa, one of the students I was supervising that semester. The stu­
dent contacted the client7 and set up an interview. Following the 
interview, Alisa would develop a ,case plan and strategy based on 
Denise's goals. Alisa would eventually counsel Denise about her 
options. Alisa would then become one of a succession of student 
attorneys to move Denise's case slowly through the overburdened 
court system. s 
The facts of Denise's case were disturbing, but not unusual.9 All 
of the divorce cases on my docket involved abuse of the wife, chil-
7. We refer to all persons calling for legal services as clients though they are not officially 
clients until a detennination is made, usually after a full interview, that we will represent 
them. See generally Alfieri, supra note 6, at 2112. While there are basic issues of eligibility 
- indigence, conflict, geography - the initial interview also provides an opportunity to 
assess if the "client" has a legal p�oblem for which our representation will make a difference. 
The demand for legal services so outstrips our ability to supply services that tough issues of 
priority have to be considered right up to the point of committing to representation. For a 
description of triage practices as they apply to legal services, see Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a 
Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1101, 1104 (1990). 
8. See Daniel Golden, Better Probate Courts Asked; Backers Say Aid Hinges On Reform, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28, 1995, at 35 (stating that the probate cpurt "system is crumbling 
under the weight of expanded responsibilities and inefficient management" leading judges, at 
times, to delay decisions for years); Daniel Golden, Caseload Burying Mass. Probate System; 
Judges Struggle With Demands, Large and Small, of Dissolving Families, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Nov. 26, 1995, at 1, 28 (describing the probate court system as overburdened because the 
court's "workload has increased, its staff has diminished, its facilities have not been modern­
ized . . .  [causing] glacial delays, lost case files, interrupted trials that don't resume for 
months, poor monitoring of guardians for disabled people, and rampant fraud on financial 
statements in divorce and child support cases"). The problems in the probate court hav� 
been recognized for years. See John H. Kennedy, Many Seek Shakeup of Probate Courts, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1991, at 1 ("[L]awyers and judges are hoping for a shakeup to a 
system that is no longer a backwater venue for divorces and wills, but a forum for profound 
and vexing decisions involving family violence and a person's right to die. "). In our experi­
ence, it takes three to six weeks to get a date for a hearing on motions for temporary orders; 
six to eight weeks to get a date to hear a motion on a contempt proceeding (such as failure to 
pay child support); four to six months to get a date for a pretrial hearing, even in simple cases 
where the trial will only be a few hours; and six months to a year to get a trial date for a 
simple, less than four hour, trial. These practical delays are in sharp contrast to the rules of 
the probate court that provide an expedited process because of an understanding that family 
matters, especially those involving children, need to be decided quickly; they involve the 
daily lives of the parties. For example, domestic relations motions may be served with only 
three days notice, see MAss. R. DoMESTic REL. P. 6( c), as compared to seven days notice for 
most other civil matters, see MAss. R. CIV. P. 6(c). 
9. There is a great reluctance in our society to recognize the reality of sexual abuse of 
children and reliable statistics as to i� prevalence are difficult to obtain. See Cynthia Grant 
Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in Sexual Abuse 
Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REv. 551 (1996) (describing the dispute over the validity of 
therapy-induced memories of abuse). The study data, however, do indicate a serious prob­
lem. See DIANA RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 15, 181-83 (1984) (first truly random 
study found 38% of the women sur\reyed reported having experienced sexual abuse before 
the age of 18, and 28% reported experiencing sexual abuse before tne age of 14); see also 
Gail Elizabeth Wyatt, The Sexual Abuse of Afro-American and White-American Women in 
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dren, or both. Often the abuse was sexual. Four pending cases in­
volved undisputed rape or sexual abuse of a daughter or daughters 
by their father.10 
After a while, try as we might, domestic attorneys, whether we 
are clinical law professors or representing for-pay clients, become 
inured to the most shocking of social taboos.11 Abuse becomes 
normalized for us. Rape of a child is awful, but it happens. Family 
law attorneys have routine ways of redressing the situation.12 This 
is the standard response: temporary protective orders in district 
Childhood, 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 507, 513 (1985) (indicating that 62% of women 
surveyed reported at least one unwanted sexual experience prior to age 18); Lois Timnick, 
The Tunes Poll: 22% in Survey Were Child Abuse Victims, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1985. Like­
wise, general violence toward women in families is pervasive. Between 1978 and 1982, an 
annual average of 2.1 million women were victims of domestic violence; this may underesti­
mate the problem since only 52% of incidents of abuse are actually reported to the police. 
See PATRICK A. LANGAN & CHrusroPHER A. INNES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
1, 3 (1986). 
10. There is much written now about, and much press attention paid to, "false" repressed 
memories of abuse. See ELLEN BASS & LINDA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL 475-534 
(1994); Bowman & Mertz, supra note 9, at 618 ("In an intriguing replay of the events of late 
nineteenth-century Vienna [when Freud initially analyzed hysteria as resulting from sexual 
abuse and then retreated from this analysis], the modem-day psychological profession and 
the media have, in recent years, first uncovered, and then to some degree renounced, child 
sexual abuse as a widespread source of adult psychological illness, particularly when the adult 
has recovered forgotten or repressed memories of abuse."). However, my experience over 
the years at LAB has been that most cases involving sexual abuse and rape of a child by the 
father are ultimately not disputed. Cf. id. at 622 ("We have no scientific basis for assessing 
the relative proportions of accurate to inaccurate claims except by reference to figures on 
actual abuse. These data show that sexual abuse is more prevalent than was previously sus­
pected and thus seem to suggest that a substantial proportion of the memories could be 
accurate.") (citations omitted). 
11. Even the legal terms "family sexual abuse" and "domestic violence" minimize the 
horror of the violations, beatings, and terror. The word "domestic" refers to the home, which 
has traditionally been viewed as part of the private realm and as a safe haven. See Elizabeth 
A. Stanko, Fear of Crime and the Myth of the Safe Home: A Feminist Critique of Criminol­
ogy, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988). 
12. Part of becoming a lawyer is being socialized into a world view. See Leslie G. Espi­
noza, Constructing a Professional Ethic: Law School Lessons and Lesions, 4 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S LJ. 215, 216 (1989-90). The legal professional's world view is that moral conduct 
is a matter of placing the case in the right category and then of following the prescribed rule: 
"Law professors and lawyers erroneously believe that their legal training and their intellec� 
tual tools will enable them "to strip a problem, any problem, down to its essentials.'" James 
R. Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64 VA. L. REV. 735, 740-
41 (1978). This kind of thinking leads lawyers to miss the substantive considerations of com­
plex, real-world problems. See id. Categorical lawyering is particularly dangerous for pov­
erty lawyers. 
Encased by tradition, poverty lawyers do not see the relevance.of client struggle and do 
not encourage its production and reenactment. .. . They, in fact, presuppose that narra­
tives of client struggle are unusable in advocacy. This presupposition silences the em­
powering voices of client struggle, a silencing tied to the denigration of client difference 
delineated by class, ethnicity, gender, race, sexual preference, and disability. 
Alfieri, supra note 6, at 2123. 
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court,13 divorce action filed in the probate court,14 and temporary 
orders during the pendency of the divorce providing for support, 
custody,15 and protection.16 The temporary probate court orders 
become permanent upon the final adjudication of the case.17 
The standard response is comforting to the attomey1s - you 
get to feel like the knight in white armor.19 It allows you not to 
think of the reality of what this family is going through. You do not 
have to ask the discomforting questions about what happened, ex­
actly, and who knew what when, exactly. It keeps the case and the 
attorney's focus forward looking. A contextual understanding of 
what happened does not really matter. Only enough of the back­
ground to support the outcome is relevant.20 What matter are the 
13. The Abuse Prevention Act was enacted in 1978; it allows protective orders to be 
sought in the district court, superior court, Boston municipal court, or probate and family 
court where the plaintiff has residence. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 209A, § 2 (1994). Most 
orders are sought initially in the district court. The district court of Massachusetts is the first 
level trial court. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 19C Gurisdiction of the district court). 
Most of the local, community lawyering - misdemeanors, landlord-tenant cases, small 
claims, domestic restraining orders, juveniles in need of services - are handled by the dis­
trict courts. 
14. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 6 (1994). 
15. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 19 (1994) (temporary care and custody of minor 
children). 
· 
16. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 18 (1994) (pendency of action for divorce; protection 
of personal liberty of spouse; restraint orders authorized). The protective order in the pro­
bate court preempts the earlier district court order. It has the advantage of continuing during 
the pendency of the divorce (not having to be renewed annually like the district court order) 
and of combining all matters in one action. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 215, § 2 (1994) ("Pro­
bate courts shall be courts of superior and general jurisdiction with reference to all cases and 
matters in which they have jurisdiction ... . "). 
17. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 21 (the court determines whether to continue the 
actions). 
· 
18. See Alfieri, supra note 6, at 2124 (arguing that the usual attorney role is comfortable 
because it establishes and maintains dominance over the client). 
19. See Lori Nessel & Kevin Ryan, Migrant Farmworkers, Homeless and Runaway Youth: 
Challenging the Barriers to Inclusion, 13 LAW & lNEo. J. 99, 138 (1994) ("Viewing poor as 
pitiful • . .  invites the attorney to see himself as a rescuer, rather than a servant. Believing 
society has neglected the education of the poor, the attorney may discount client's intelli­
gence [and] assume control of the relationship . . • .  ");Gary Brown et al., Comment, Starting 
a TRO Project: Student Representation of Battered Women, 96 YALE LJ. 1985, 2015 (1987) 
(discussing the importance of alerting students to their own "savior syndrome" and teaching 
appropriate professional distancing). 
20. See Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyering 
as Ponrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. 
REV. 1157, 1173 (1990) (indicating that many poverty lawyers fail to perceive client auton­
omy and their own professional dominance in trying to get clients "something rather than 
nothing"); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for 
Clients To Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 545 (1987-88) ("Not only do 
clients feel incapable of speaking and acting freely in the strange language and culture of the 
courtroom; in addition, their own lawsuits are often framed to render their perceptions and 
passions irrelevant to the legal claims."). 
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solutions.21 Get the father out of the house, keep him away from 
the family. Get the mother control of her life and the children. Ob­
tain physical and legal custody for the mother, no visitation for the 
father, and protective orders to allow the mother to get the police 
to help to keep the father away.22 
This is exactly what happened with Denise Gray. It is now Oc­
tober of 1996. Denise is divorced. The children are with her. The 
children have no contact with their father. Their father is re­
strained permanently from coming close to them, from calling 
them, from having someone else call them on his behalf. 
So why is it that I cannot just close the case file and move on 
from this case? Perhaps it is because of all the things that Denise 
and I did not discuss. 
Right up to the day of the divorce hearing, Denise was ex­
tremely ambivalent about contacting her husband, Robert. She was 
clear in stating that she wanted a divorce and a "no contact" order. 
Indeed, she presented a polished account of the horrors of her years 
with Robert in a number of preliminary court hearings.23 But 
21. These are pre-ordained "lawyer" solutions, consistent with the system of knowledge 
and language that support the inevitable event or action. See Paul Ricoeur, Structure, Word, 
Event, in THE CoNFLicr OF INTERPRETATIONS 79, 81 (James R. Edie et al. eds., Robert 
Sweeney trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1974). 
22. The actual protection provided by restraining orders is limited. A woman with a re­
straining order can call the police if her abuser appears at her door - assuming there is 
enough time to make the call and that the police respond. See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering 
for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOF­
STRA L. REv. 1243, 1263 (1993) (noting police reluctance to respond to domestic calls); see 
also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa­
tion, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 68-71 (1991) (describing "separation assault"). The myth is that the 
legal solution protects. The reality, and lived terror, for abused women is that the restraining 
order may trigger more violence. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 
110 (1987) (estimating that half of the women who leave their abusers are further harassed or 
attacked). But see Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for 
Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders Are Not, 67 IND. LJ. 1039, 1047-53 (1992). 
23. Over the years, Robert went through cycles of violence. Cf. LENORE E. WALKER, 
THE BATTERED WOMAN 55-70 (1979) (battering tends to have a cyclical dynainic character­
ized by a tension building phase, an acute battering phase, and a loving-repentant phase). 
For example, when Denise was pregnant with Lily, Robert beat her so badly that she had to 
be hospitalized with a concussion. See id. at 105-06 (pregnancy is a nearly universal trigger 
for violence in a battering relationship). Robert would stop beating Denise for a while, usu­
ally during a time when he would stop drinking. Then the drinking, gambling, and violence 
would begin again. For an interesting historical perspective on the relationship between alco­
hol and abuse, see Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman 
Who Kills A Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CruM. L. REV. 229, 260 (1996) 
("For the first wave [of feininism], "drinking was a veritable code word for male violence.' 
The Temperance Movement was highly successful in passing the Eighteenth amendment in 
1919 prohibiting the sale of alcohol . . . .  The second wave of feminism has also focused on 
temperance. Battered women's shelters first opened in 1973 for the wives of alcoholics and 
were funded by Alcoholics Anonymous.") (citations oinitted). 
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Denise kept calling Robert.24 A week before the final hearing, 
Denise called Robert at the prison where he was serving time for a 
number of offenses, including the sexual assault of his daughter. 
She apologetically told her lawyers that she missed him. In the two 
years of processing this case, the only time Denise cried was when 
reminiscing on what good friends she and Robert were, how close 
they were. Denise recounted how they struggled together, through 
long talks and much therapy, to address his drinking, gambling, and 
violence, and how much she missed him. 
Certainly Denise, her succession of student lawyers, and I were 
aware of the significance of the divorce document that would detail 
the terms of the final order. We were devising a pattern for the 
interactions - or lack thereof - of this family. But we did not 
really think about or discuss the actual impact of the order. For 
example, what was the role of the extended families? How would 
the families be affected by the order? Did it matter that Denise and 
Robert Gray had two children, a sixteen year old son, Eric, and a 
now fourteen year old daughter, Lily? Did it matter that at the 
time of the final divorce hearing, Eric had a son; Denise and Robert 
were now grandparents? Did it matter that Denise was a white, 
Jewish woman? Did it matter that Robert was an African Ameri­
can man? 
For Denise, the two years of court appearances and negotiating 
a divorce agreement were about much more than standard legal 
outcomes. This time was fundamentally about the way that Denise 
understood her life. Lawyers are not trained as therapists.25 We 
are quick to remind our clients and ourselves that we are not ther­
apists. And yet the construction of a legal story, the obtaining of 
the facts, the structuring and development of the background of the 
case, requires the client to build a narrative.26 And like it or not, 
the building of a narrative is a powerful force in developing an un­
derstanding of self.27 
24. Few battering relationships are unidimensional. They involve love and companion­
ship as well as violence and fear. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 36. 
25. See Nancy Blodgett, Lawyer/therapist, Hear divorce clients out, 71 LAwScoPE 27 
(1985); Stephen Ellman, Critical Theories and Legal Ethics: The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for 
Lawyers, 81 GEO. LJ. 2665, 2700 n.100 (1993). 
26. See Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. LJ. 2475, 2490-91 (1993); Sharon 
Creeden, Telling Your Client's Story to the Jury, TENN. B.J., May-June 1991, at 10; Sympo­
sium, Lawyers as Storytellers & Storytellers as Lawyers: An Interdisciplinary Symposium Ex­
ploring the Use of Storytelling in the Practice of Law, 18 VT. L. REv. 565 (1994); Symposium, 
Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989). 
27. See, e.g., JANINE ROBERTS, TALES AND TRANSFORMATIONS 1-11 (1994). 
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The first part of this article will examine the importance of con­
structing a narrative to clients who have suffered domestic 
trauma.zs These clients are overwhelmingly women.29 Much has 
been written about the importance of giving voice to the client's 
story.30 However, the psychological and sociological literature on 
victi.Iils of sexual and domestic abuse makes it clear that for most of 
these victims, especially at the time they become our clients, the 
story of their past is shifting and restructuring. As their present 
changes, as they break from an abusive relationship, they see events 
differently. The perspective they will ultimately adopt, for purposes 
of their own healing, as well as for purposes of a legal case, is still in 
the making. 31 
The way that the victims of trauma grow to understand what 
happened to them and what was of their making may be central to 
their survival.32 Recovery is premised on the ability to see oneself, 
not only now but also in the past, simultaneously as a victim and a 
survivor.33 This takes time. Lawyer interaction with a client who 
has been abused should allow the client the space to construct a 
story in her own time.34 Lawyers should adopt a more fluid tech­
nique of interviewing and counseling that provides space for an 
evolving contextual understanding of the client's personal history. 
Even more challenging, legal interaction should incorporate cul-
28. See JUDITH L. HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 3 (1992). 
29. See id. ("[T]he subordinate condition of women is maintained and enforced by the 
hidden violence of men. There is a war between the sexes. Rape victims, battered women 
and sexually abused children are its casualties. Hysteria is the combat neurosis of the sex 
war."); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO TIIE 
NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 21 (1983) (stating that 95% of domestic vio· 
Jenee victims are women). 
30. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 6; Cahn, supra note 26; Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of 
Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, ITT Mica. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Christopher 
P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and 
Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992); White, supra note 20; Lucie E. White, 
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. 
G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
31. See ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 7-8 ("Therapists need to let the multitude of perspec­
tives that clients bring be told, hold them, and then help them construct new meanings that 
work better for them and in their relationships with others."). 
32. See BASS & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 31 (describing the healing power of stories for 
survivors of sexual abuse); TONI ANN LAIDLAW ET AL., HEALING VOICES: FEMINIST AP­
PROACHES TO THERAPY WITH WOMEN xiv (1990) ("The healing [feminist therapists] refer to 
involves an inner change made up of two parts: the identification and expression of feelings 
and the reframing of destructive and unhealthy beliefs."). 
33. See BASS & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 186; MiruAM GREENSPAN, A NEW APPROACH 
TO WOMEN & THERAPY 265-82 (1983). 
34. See LAIDLAW, supra note 32, at 4 (describing the need to let the patient choose the 
pace of therapeutic work); ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 10-11 (noting the importance of let­
ting the story develop in all its re tellings). 
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tural and sociopolitical exploration.35 Recognition of the patterns 
of oppression that link victim-survivors to each other is a crucial 
element in constructing individual histories.36 Clients and lawyers 
do not exist in a vacuum that separates us from social patterns. A 
less detached, less categorical,37 and less judgmental form of client 
interaction will open doors to deeper understanding for both the 
client and the lawyer.3s 
In the second part of this article, I will challenge the predomi­
nant approach to client interaction as genderized and racialized. 
Lawyers reproduce in our individual relationship with clients the 
broader patterns of law that oppress outsiders.39 We do not wrestle 
with the impact of gender-related trauma. Likewise we do not rec­
ognize that race matters. Race is invisible, it is mute, despite its 
omnipresence.40 In our interactions with clients, we are silent about 
race. Lawyer silence is a reflection of the predominant theoretical 
approach to racial justice - colorblindness.41 The law, and, ergo, 
35. See Vincent Fish, Poststructuralism in Family Therapy: Interrogating the Narrative/ 
Conversational Mode, 19 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 221 (1993) (arguing that therapists 
using narrative therapies must also be attentive to historical, political, and social context). 
36. See ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 130 ("Cultural stories also have profound implications 
for how the past can be explained as well as the future imagined."). 
37. See ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMI­
NIST THOUGIIT 44 (1988) (noting the tendency to establish categories that reduce people to a 
universal characteristic, failing to note significant differences). 
38. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1669 ("When feminism and clinical education claim 
that experience precedes explanation, and that explanation must remain open to experience, 
they are tacitly recognizing the role of affect in experience and, therefore, in human 
understanding."). 
39. "Outsider" is a term adopted by Professor Mari Matsuda to designate persons of 
color, women, gays, lesbians, and other oppressed groups. See Mari Matsuda, Public Re­
sponses to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's. Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2323 n.15 
(1989). In support of this alternative terminology, Matsuda explains that the term "minority" 
is a misnomer because of the large numbers of persons in excluded groups. See id. Professor 
Matsuda also discusses the importance of recognizing outsider perspectives to various legal 
issues. See Mari J. Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in 
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that society should include 
outsider perceptions in order to combat racist preconceptions); see also Richard Delgado, 
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412 
(1989) (describing outsiders as "groups whose marginality defines the boundaries of the 
mainstream, whose voice and perspective - whose consciousness - has been suppressed, 
devalued, and abnormalized"). 
40. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LoPEZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE (1996); CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993). 
41. See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of 
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162 
(1994); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 2, 3 
(1991) ("A color-blind interpretation of the Constitution legitimates, and thereby maintains, 
the social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other Americans."). 
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the lawyer, strive to treat everyone as if they were the same color, 
the same race.42 
Colorblindness does not erase subordination, colorblindness 
perpetuates it. Colorblind lawyering acts as a barrier to any ac­
knowledgment and response to the reality of the impact of race in 
our clients' lives.43 Denise's lawyers knew her husband was Black, 
and that the children of this marriage were multiracial and catego­
rized as Black by society and themselves.44 This most salient factor 
of the family's dynamic was never mentioned. As a lawyer, I was 
not trained how to talk about race.45 And I have not trained the 
next generation of lawyers how to talk about race. This article is a 
call for change, for race-conscious legal education. 
For women of color and families of color who have suffered 
abuse and now seek legal assistance, the barrier to discussing 
trauma combines with the inhibition to discussing race. The conflu­
ence of trauma and race particularizes the need for women clients 
to develop a narrative that truly reflects the complexities of their 
experience.46 Remembering that we live in a society in which lan­
guage itself is limited in its ability to speak of oppression,47 it is 
necessary to consciously reach for understanding through patience 
42. For a prominent example of this mindset, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 
S. Ct. 2097, 2118·19 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("To pursue the concept of racial 
entitlement - even for the most admirable and benign of purposes - is to reinforce and 
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege 
and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American."). 
43. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race·Consciousness, 91 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1060 (1991) (discussing how colorblindness perpetuates racism and arguing for color· 
consciousness). 
44. The politics of identity in our society erases any complexity of identity by imposing 
strict categories and classifying individuals by pushing them to the most oppressed category. 
See Espinoza, supra note 1, at 27; Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and 
White, Different, and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990) (arguing that impermea­
ble boundaries are drawn both within and between the categories of race and gender). 
45. For an excellent discussion of how legal education treats race as if it were irrelevant, 
while at the same time racializing in its subtext almost all interactions, see Judith G. 
Greenberg, Erasing Race From Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 55 (1994) 
("[D]espite their claims to be color-blind, law schools provide inherent preferences for stu­
dents who can act, think, and write white."). See also Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core 
Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL L. REv. 1511 (1991). 
46. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (noting the multidimensionality of Black women's lives); Angela P. 
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 595 (1990); see 
also ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 130-38. 
47. Noell Bisseret Moreau argues that "language is the medium through which the domi­
nant and the dominated consciously and unconsciously perceive and interpret their social 
roles." NOELL BISSERET MOREAU, EDUCATION, IDEOLOGY, AND CLASS/SEX IDENTITY IN 
LANGUAGE AND POWER 59 (Cheris Kramarae et al. eds., 1984). 
February 1997] Legal Narratives 911 
and empathy.48 It is the obligation of the lawyer to facilitate the 
client's construction of narrative. 
I am less optimistic than many legal scholars about our ability to 
empower our clients in the legal system. Often we seem to be a 
counterproductive force in our clients' ability to repair their psy­
chological and social lives. There is a strong desire not to see that 
which we worry we cannot repair. The take-charge, straightforward 
categorization of the problem and application of the usual solutions 
is the prescribed attorney response. Lawyers are taught to avoid 
the complications and emotions of our clients' lives.49 Our legal 
distance validates the dysfunctional· normalization of abuse that 
usually occurs in abusive families.so Our discomfort in acknowledg­
ing race acts as a denial of the lived reality of racism that pervades 
the lives of our clients of color and their families. To represent 
race, to represent the oppressed, to represent the abused, we need 
to reexamine and reinvent lawyering in our individual interactions 
with clients. 
l. THE MULTIPLE lNTENTIONALITIES OF CLIENT NARRATIVES 
A. From Reminiscence to Fact to Reality: The Importance of 
Narrative to Self-Understanding 
For me, Denise's story began in October 1994. For Denise, her 
"story" is her life: her understanding and interpretation of past, 
present, and future are continually in the making.51 This was clear 
to me throughout the two years of her legal representation. But it 
was frustrating.52 I did not want to afford Denise the right to emo­
tional ambiguity, to selective factual memory, to differential em­
phasis, or to editing. As Denise's past related to present and future, 
48. See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, 
Old Wounds?, f!J7 MICH. L. REv. 2099 {1989); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the 
Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 V AND. L. REv. 1665, 1688 (1990) 
(stories can create "bridges across gaps in experience and thereby elicit empathic 
understanding"). 
49. See Juorra N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964) (lawyering is seen as rule application, 
divorced from its subjective context). 
50. See BAss & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 46 (explaining the minimizing and rationalizing 
phenomenon that take place in abusive families). 
51. See ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 4 ("[In stories t]here is a resonance, an echoing of 
themes and issues, that helps us to understand that in the present we are always carrying our 
past as well as imagining our future. The present is the pivot point linking past and future."). 
52. See White, supra note 30 (capturing, with insight and empathy toward lawyer and 
client, the frustration of a legal services attorney representing an impoverished client whose 
story was complex, as was her life). 
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I found myself fighting Denise's choices and actions, which so often 
seemed to me to be changing and contradictory.s3 
Why did I have so much trouble with Denise's fluidity (or vacil­
lations, depending on one's perspective)? The right to ambiguity, 
to nonlinear understanding, is one I always give to myself in con­
structing my life story.s4 Although it is easy for me to give a de­
tailed, chronological history of my education and employment, it is 
nearly impossible for me to recount a "story" of my personal rela­
tionships - whether platonic or intimate. I do not think of my life 
this way.ss This is particularly true of those memories that are pain­
ful, embarrassing, conflicted, or traumatic.s6 If pressed, I can cate­
gorize. Given enough time, I can joumalistically account. 
However, even the most "name, date, and place" account captures 
only the perspective of the moment of that telling. Why should 
Denise be different? 
"People connect and make meaning of the events in their lives 
and express their values, beliefs, and visions through the stories 
they tell."S7 Storytelling - explaining what happened - is expo­
nentially more complicated and emotionally laden for abuse survi­
vors.ss The narrator must position herself. She must place herself 
in relation to the other people involved in the case.s9 To cohere, 
53. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 15-18 (describing the dual phenomenon of ambiva­
lence and denial that are often part of the abused woman's response). 
54. I think of my constantly evolving and shifting memories and ambitions as "insights." 
See ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 5 ("Stories provide a wealth of indices with which to connect 
information on different levels or in different ways. Because each person carries a unique set 
of life experiences, stories provide multiple possibilities for each individual to make meaning 
of them.") (citation omitted). 
55. Roberts observes: "Our minds are constantly involved in internal dialogues and visu­
alizations. When we speak, we share only a small portion of our experiences." Id. at 10. 
56. See BASs & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 72 (memories tend to return in fragments); 
HERMAN, supra note 28, at 30-32, 68-129 (describing memory patterns of trauma survivors, 
including battered women, sexual abuse survivors, rape victims, and political prisoners); see 
also Bowman & Mertz, supra note 9, at 600-04 (describing the process of memory and effects 
of trauma) (1993). 
57. ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 7. 
58. See LAIDLAW, supra note 32, at 3 (describing feminist therapy based on challenging 
current psychotherapy models that refused to acknowledge the violence against women and 
their repression - and silenced the expression of that reality by patients); J. LAIRD, 
WOMEN'S SECRETS - WOMEN'S SILENCES (1993). 
59. See James R. Elkins, From the Symposium Editor, Pedagogy of Narrative: A Sympo­
sium, 40 J. LEGAL Eo. 1, 2 (1990) ("It is the story of Jaw (as it is set alongside other stories) 
that locates us in relation to others: to family, community, work. We use legal narratives, as 
we use other stories, to give meaning to social existence, to ourselves as women and men, as 
people of color, as persons the culture welcomes or fears."). 
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the story must have a theme.6° The client must position herself in 
relationship to the theme. 
The telling of the legal "story" for the abuse survivor requires 
her to make choices about what is important, who is important, and 
why. She must cast intimates, children, family, and friends in roles. 
With her lawyer, she must play the lead character. The script that 
unfolds becomes the basis for her understanding of reality.61 The 
lawyer and the legal system, often unwittingly, tum that script into 
the one "true" story. 
Stories, however, are not static.62 They develop and change as 
the storyteller's life changes. More importantly, the interaction be­
tween story, understanding, and lived experience is dynamic and 
dialectic.63 Abuse survivors, in particular, need the space to de­
velop their story. 
It is of course impossible to talk about a legal problem without 
telling a story.64 To move forward in the world of cases and courts, 
at some point a basic story must develop. The legal system then 
freezes that story in time. It becomes the official story.65 The cohe­
sion and persuasiveness of the story is the basis for case theory.66 
The power of legal stories is that they are binding once translated 
from client interview and counseling to courthouse.67 
60. Individual and family experiences develop thematic structure. "Important behavioral 
sequences then become organized around these themes which often serve as metaphors for 
the type of symptom that is chosen. By "theme' is meant a specific emotionally laden issue 
around which there is a recurring conflict" PEGGY PAPP, THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 14 
{1983); see also ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 7. 
61. See LAIDLAW, supra note 32, at xiv. 
62. See ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 2; Cunningham, supra note 30, at 2474-75 ("In this 
model, language plays a central role in the constitution of knowledge out of experience. The 
very process of naming reduces the particularity of experience to reveal inherent factors of 
form and relation, then formalizes and stabilizes them .... By giving a name to experience, 
consciousness frees itself from passive captivity to sensation and experience and creates a 
world of its own, a world of representation . ... The world of representation, the realm of 
knowledge, is in dynamic relation with the world of experience."). 
63. See ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 3 ("Characters can be easily moved through time, new 
ideas introduced, and endings reworked and/or changed."). 
64. See Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAw's STORIES 14 (Peter 
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) ("The law, focused on putting facts in the world into 
coherent form and presenting them persuasively - to make a "case' - must always be 
intimately intertwined with rhetoric and narrative."). 
65. See Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 64, 
at 2, 5 (reminding the reader that "law is not literature," and that real people may be torn 
and twisted by the judicial system's evaluation of a client's story). 
66. See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case 
Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 487 {1994) ("Case theory - or theory of the case - can be 
seen as an explanatory statement linking the "case' to the client's experience of the world."). 
67. See Cunningham, supra note 30, at 2461 ("Implicitly, every complaint, every brief, 
every opening argument, even every negotiation begins with the assertion, "this is a true 
story.' "). The ability to change a story in the middle of a case is limited. The client loses 
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Thus, the problem for lawyers representing abuse survivors is 
first to see the client's story as necessarily flexible. A client should 
have the room to develop a variety of perspectives. This is part of 
the healing process. Storytelling often takes place and is under­
stood on different levels with each retelling.68 After care to de­
velop the story has been given, the lawyer and client can work 
together to articulate the legal story.69 
There is a second problem for the lawyer representing abuse 
survivors. Their stories capture more than the individual narrative 
and the family narrative. Client stories also capture the broader 
sociopolitical narrative.70 This is particularly true of the stories of 
"outsiders." Often without the vehicle of a story, the story of op­
pression would be untold.71 Stories are told within the universe of 
the dominant discourse.72 Language as a product of a hierarchical 
society often renders mute the experience of oppression. It is 
through stories that understanding is derived.73 Stories thus have 
credibility. See, e.g., White, supra note 30, at 48-49. Witness the difficulty judges have with 
domestic violence victims who understand their situation differently at different times and 
whose experiences do not conform with the experiences of the judges. See Karen Czapan­
skiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on 
Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 252 {1993) (relating a story of a woman who 
was denied a protection order because the judge did not believe that, if he were in the 
woman's situation, he would not stay in it, and thus he did not believe that the violence had 
occurred). 
68. See BASS & DA vis, -supra note 10, at 107 {Ella, an incest survivor, explains the various 
levels of telling, and how each telling opened the possibility for the next kind of telling). 
69. See Miller, supra note 66, at 523-24 (arguing that clients should be included in the 
development of the story used as case theory). 
70. See ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 129 ("It is important to have the possibility of resona­
tion between personal stories and cultural stories - resonation that allows people to see how 
their particular experience is intertwined with the political and social history of their 
society."). 
71. "Outsider" clients are tasked with telling their story using the language of those in 
power. The challenge is how to use that language to provide appropriate meaning to experi­
ence not contemplated by the dominant language. See Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, 
Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DuKE 
LJ. 625, 629 (asserting that traditional legal language has extreme difficulty describing the 
harms suffered by disempowered groups, particularly Native Americans); White, supra note 
30, at 8-9 (writing about women: "Every word that they speak, every silence, carries the risk 
of subversion, of a double meaning that those in power can never fully understand"). 
72. See Delgado, supra note 39 (examining the use of narratives in legal discourse to 
challenge the status quo that is perpetuated and protected by the dominant discourse). 
73. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 19 CAL. L. REV. 971 {1991); Mary I. 
Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 CoLO. L. REV. 683, 695-96 
{1992) (remarking that outsider scholarship "seeks to cross the boundaries that define [the] 
community by speaking to the dominant community, but in a different voice" and arguing 
that the voice often expresses itself through narratives and stories that expose oppression 
which is overlooked and ignored in mainstream legal discourse). 
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the power to build individual lives and to reveal the workings of the 
systems of power that affect those lives.74 
The stories of women who are traumatized by abuse are sup­
pressed75 by the normalization of violence toward women and chil­
dren.76 Subordination of women-treating them like objects of 
property77-is our cultural legacy.78 Historically, this violence has 
been acknowledged as the private right of men ruling families.79 
Violence and rape of women are now tacitly allowed by the sup­
pression of knowledge about abuse and the failure of the society to 
redress abuse. When women and children do speak, their stories 
are distorted to make them willing victims, liars, provocateurs, and 
74. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Forward: Nomos and Narra­
tive, 97 HARV. L. REY. 4 (1983); Delgado, supra note 39, at 2437 (stories are therapeutic for 
outsiders); Minow, supra note 48, at 1688 (stories give "voice to suppressed perspectives" and 
help "build a reservoir of alternative understandings" of existing practices). 
75. See BAss & DA VIS, supra note 10, at 479-83 (short history of suppression of reality of 
sexual abuse); HERMAN, supra note 28, at 28-30; ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 9 (noting that 
some therapeutic stories, "particularly women's stories, may have become unspeakable or 
silenced. There may be no language to describe events such as torture, genocide, or severe 
abuse and trauma . . . .  Stories may have been silenced because of male privilege, control of 
media, print and other forms of communication. Abusers may threaten and/or hurt their 
victims to keep them silent about violence, sexual molestation, and incest. Out of fear of 
their own safety, victims may not speak."); see also Mahoney, supra note 22, at 11 ("massive 
denial [of domestic violence] throughout society and the legal system"); Murphy, supra note 
22, at 1259 ("Because it has historically been linked to silence and inaction from the legal 
system, domestic violence is another area in which narrative can play a powerful role in 
destroying stereotypes and prompting legal change."). 
76. For example, even with all the official acknowledgment of widespread battering, me­
dia images are of individual, sensational cases. This works to "normalize" the everyday do­
mestic violence. The horrific domestic violence, the extreme case, is the only "real" domestic 
violence. It is the only domestic violence worth doing something about, and it is by definition 
"rare or exceptional." Mahoney, supra note 22, at 2-3; see also BAss & DA VIS, supra note 10, 
at 477 ("Extreme cases of abuse were presented as the norm so as to provoke disbelief about 
child sexual abuse."). This phenomenon happens with rape as well. While acknowledging 
the widespread occurrence of rape, the myth, perpetuated by the power of media stories, is 
that rape is the action of a few horrific serial criminals. See Mary I. Coombs, Telling the 
Victim's Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 285 (1993) ("One can understand why men react 
as they do. It is in their gendered interest to believe rape and sexual harassment are rare 
events, attributable only to monsters . . .  "); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? 
Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1013 
(1991). 
77. See Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 5 (1988) (elo­
quently describing the commodification of people of color and of women). 
78. See SHULAMITII FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST 
REYOLlTllON (1970) (describing the oppression of women throughout history); LINDA 
GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIO­
LENCE 3 (1988). 
79. See Murphy, supra note 22, at 1262 ("Under the guise of protecting citizens from the 
state interference in the "private' family sphere, common law in this country permitted a 
husband to beat his wife, as long as the beating was not "excessive.' "). 
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crazies.80 Those who assist in the telling of these stories are like­
wise persecuted.st 
For women who have been traumatized by male oppression, the 
individual story must be linked with and understood through the 
prism of the cultural story.82 Therapists treating women and chil­
dren who have been traumatized by violence and sexual assault use 
stories, individual and cultural, to heal.83 The process of the story­
telling can allow the individual to reexamine and reconstruct the 
meaning of her own life in a cultural context. However, "[i]t is hard 
to link past, present, and future in one's life when the cultural sto­
ries that frame one's experience are storied in stereotypical, inaccu­
rate, narrow, and rigid ways."84 Thus, the individual story must also 
be a vehicle for breaking the oppression of the stories of the domi­
nant discourse.ss The client narrative, developed through inter­
viewing and counseling, has the power to articulate many different 
80. See BASS & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 477 ("Most of the [press] coverage [of sexual 
abuse cases] has been extremely adversarial, belittling survivors, depicting them as gullible 
victims, vengeful children, or simply crazy."); HERMAN, supra note 28, at 8; Coombs, supra 
note 76, at 280-86 ("[F)act finders discredit women's claims of sexual violation by dividing 
them into two categories: "Not True' and "So What.' " Within these categories, women are 
deliberate liars, or irrationally sensitive, or they were not really "victims" but participants.). 
81. See HERMAN, supra note 28, at 2; Bowman & Mertz, supra note 9. 
82. See Fish, supra note 35, at 228 (arguing that therapists may have tendencies "to con­
ceptually isolate the therapist-family system from any social, historical, economic, or institu­
tional context, and to deny the existence or relevance of differences in power at an 
interpersonal level. Splitting off a separate world of language, divorced from any notion of a 
relevant social and material realm, they enforce a conceptual blackout which begins at the 
edges of the family's story, or conversation."). Obviously, cultural explorations may not be 
appropriate for all clients in all situations. See ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 134 ("It is impor­
tant at the outset to say that the ways in which any of these techniques are done is essential to 
their usefulness. Whenever one tries to do some fitting between an individual's experience 
and larger external occurrences, there is the risk of overgeneralizing and/or stereotyping."). 
83. See ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 134 ("It can be very healing for people to see that the 
dilemmas they are caught in are not unique to their experience, but rather are embedded in 
larger societal problems and societal change. This can help them move out of stances of self­
blame to positions that recognize how the social context affects individual Jives. Sometimes 
this also leads to political action or advocacy work."); cf. GINNY N1CARTiiY, THE ONES WHO 
GoT AWAY 3-5 (1987) (stating that the use of stories of battered women who leave empow­
ers others to see their situation as part of a pattern, to not feel so uniquely hopeless, to see 
other possibilities). 
84. ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 130. 
85. See id. at 129-30. Roberts describes the two predominant strands of stories about 
Native Americans - the Noble Savage or the Fierce Savage. Neither dominant discourse 
archetype captures the reality of the richness of the lives of Native Americans (with over 700 
tribes in the United States alone) nor the reality of calculated genocide by the Europeans. 
"[I)t is difficult for young Native Americans to imagine a multidimensional future when their 
present life is not seen and their past life has been storied in a banal manner." Id. at 130; see 
a/so ROBERT A. WILUAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: 
THE D1scouRSES OF CoNOUEST (1990) (explaining how the dominant discourse has distorted 
understanding of Native American history and present). 
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visions.86 With each retelling the client is better able to construct a 
meaning for her own life, and to sort through false visions of her 
individual story and of cultural stories that constrain her.87 
B. Client Interviewing: Imposition of Dominant Legal Narratives 
October is the middle of the semester at LAB. Alisa was as­
signed Denise's case in October 1994. She had an upcoming hear­
ing in another case. She consulted with me and scheduled Denise's 
initial interview for early November. There was no real hurry -
the client was protected by a restraining order until December. 
Alisa and I both thought of Denise as "the client." She was not a 
person to us yet, though we knew many of the details of her private 
life. After all, it was late October. Alisa was now like me; she was 
comfortable being a lawyer. Denise was a "case."88 She was a di­
vorce with issues of custody and visitation, complicated by sexual 
abuse of a child; it was not likely that there would be money issues. 
The client was on Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC). 
Like most law school clinics, our students are taught to follow 
an interview model theoretically based on ''client-centered" lawyer­
ing.89 The model is developed in their course textbook.90 The stu-
86. These individual visions also provide an opportunity to change cultural structures. 
See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741, 
764 (1994) ("Storytelling serves to create and confirm identity, both individual and 
collective."). 
87. See Fish, supra note 35, at 230 ("Families and individuals do construct their lives, 
including their ·own stories: these stories both make possible and constrain their exist­
ence . • • .  [However], they have not made these stories "just as they please'. Nor may we 
assist them to construct new stories, and different lives, just as we please. There are circum­
stances which are, inevitably, directly encountered, by us and those we try to help, and these 
are the result of antecedent individual, group, and institutional processes." (citation 
omitted)). 
88. See Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a 
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEo. L.J. 1603, 1609-10 (1989) (arguing that poverty lawyers 
who rely on conventional approaches to their clients' problems, justify this consciously by 
their own sense of expertise and unconsciously through desire for domination, while trying 
hard to seek their clients' "best interests"). 
89. See generally DOUGLAS E. RosENTiiAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHo's IN CHARGE? 
(1974) (arguing for client participation in the lawyering process and shared lawyer-client re­
sponsibility for choices made in the case). 
90. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN c. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: 
A Ct.IENT-CE.NTEREo APPROACH (1977). The client-centered philosophy is also the core of 
the other major clinical teaching texts. See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JosEPH D. HARBAUGH, 
INTERVIEWING, CoUNSEUNG, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECllVE REPRESENTATION 
4 (1990) ("Most important, the text constructs a concept for lawyering that envisions lawyer 
and client as partners working toward a common goal, with the client responsible for the 
major decisions and the lawyer functioning as helper, adviser, and advocate."); GARY 
BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLlNICAL INSTRUC. 
TION IN ADVOCACY (1978). 
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dent-attomey91 begins the interview by asking the client in an open­
ended way, "what brings you here today?" This begins a client­
based articulation of the issue or problem.92 The interviewer then 
asks the client to state her goals.93 After these goals are articulated, 
the interviewer proceeds to obtain a factual chronology. This is the 
client's opportunity to "tell her story," but in a guided, timeline ori­
ented way.94 After · developing the chronology, the student­
attomey should ask follow-up questions in specific areas that give 
needed information for case theory development.95 
In November, Alisa met with me and discussed her interview 
plan. We both assumed that it would be challenging. Alisa knew 
that she needed information about sensitive subjects, particularly 
the sexual abuse of Lily. She needed to know if the abuse was doc­
umented by medical records, a Department of Social Services re­
port, or court findings. Alisa also needed to find out about any 
abuse the client or the other child, Eric, suffered. Alisa assumed 
that she would need to file a divorce complaint quickly and seek 
temporary orders in the Probate Court before the restraining order 
in the District Court expired. There was a lot of work in front of 
her, but Alisa told me she was glad to put in extra hours to protect 
this client and her children.96 
Alisa said that she would meet with me about the case after the 
interview. As is the usual practice at LAB, with the client's con­
sent, Alisa would video tape the interview. The video tape, as Alisa 
would explain to the client, would then be used only for the pur­
poses of supervision within LAB. 
91. Students in Massachusetts, as in most states, may act as a lawyer under the rules of 
court. See MAss. SuP. JuD. CT. R. 3:03 (1996) (restricting student attorneys to representation 
of indigent clients only and requiring students to be supervised). We emphasize at LAB that 
student lawyering is direct representation, with the clinical supervisor as supervisor, not co­
counsel. This is problematic over longer cases because LAB is a semester program. Often, 
as with Denise, a client who has a case open for two years will have five or six different 
student attorneys. Student attorneys are required to keep detailed case notes and to write 
comprehensive transfer memoranda. Nevertheless, the one stable relationship is with the 
supervising attorney. While unspoken, both client and supervisor recognize the importance 
of having lived through the many experiences of the case. 
92. See BINDER & PRicE, supra note 90, at 53-59. The more recent edition of the text­
book slightly alters the descriptions of the interview model, but not significantly. See DAVID 
A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS CoUNsELORS: A CUENT·CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 
1991). 
93. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 90, at 53, 59-60. 
94. See id. at 53-54, 72-75. 
95. See id. at 54, 85-92. 
96. See Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level 
Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 950 (1992) (noting the lure of the "rescue mission" for 
poverty lawyers). 
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Some hours later, Alisa appeared at my office door. I looked up 
and said, "What happened?" Alisa was visibly shaken. She told me 
that she did not know what to do. She did not know if she could 
continue with this case. The interview, she said, went terribly. 
Nothing happened as she planned it. I paused, and in my best "un­
derstanding supervisor" voice said, "Well, why don't we go watch 
some of the tape and talk about what happened." 
The initial interview of Denise Gray began with her pronounce­
ment that she wanted to work toward reconciliation with Robert. 
Alisa was dumbfounded, literally. Denise continued, uninter­
rupted. Alisa's interview plan collapsed around her. Denise ex­
plained that there had always been problems in her marriage, in her 
relationship with Robert. Actually, she said, she and Robert had 
worked out terrible things in the past. Robert, Denise explained, 
had an awful childhood. He is Black. He grew up very poor. He 
was beaten by his father continually. They both had been in and 
out of therapy, individually and together. She hoped that things 
could work out again. But she did want a legal separation. 
Alisa, pulling herself together on the tape, then explained that 
LAB would need some general background information on the his­
tory of Denise's relationship with Robert. At this point, I stopped 
the tape and asked Alisa what she was thinking. The discomfort 
and anxiety poured out of Alisa. She repeated that she did not 
think that she could represent Denise. She explained that this feel­
ing got worse as the interview went on. Denise, she said, wants to 
get back together with the guy who raped their daughter: "I can't 
work toward that." Denise, she said, only seems to care about los­
ing Robert. She only seems to feel sorry for him. 
Denise told Alisa that a year earlier, when Lily told Denise that 
her father was "messing" with her, she immediately confronted 
Robert. He did not deny it. Denise asked him to leave. She then 
went to the District Court and got a ten-day temporary restraining 
order. She did not go to court for the full hearing to extend it for a 
year because she hoped that the family could work things out. 
However, the Department of Social Services (DSS) was notified 
when the temporary order was issued. DSS informed Denise that if 
she did not extend the order, they would consider her neglectful of 
Lily. Denise went back and got the order issued for a year. 
Denise requested that the order only restrain Robert from abus­
ing Lily and keep him away from the house. The order did not 
prohibit contact with Denise or Lily. And though Robert was now 
living with his girlfriend, Denise saw him a number of times. 
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Denise also arranged for Robert to see Lily. He took her bowling 
several times. After all, Denise explained, he is her father.97 
Denise also explained, very matter-of-factly, that the abuse was 
only "digital."98 It was when Robert tried to have intercourse with 
Lily that Lily told her mother.99 
Alisa and I watched some more of the tape. We stopped and 
talked. Alisa raised all the big ethical issues. I gave them the labels 
of the profession. We talked about ethical rules and personal 
morals.10° Neither of us could answer the most basic question of 
97. Cf. Mahoney, supra note 22, at 20-21: 
Since mothers bear much of the responsibility for the emotional ties between the fathers 
and children in our society, the new family structure changes her responsibilities to all 
parties: if the children are not physically harmed, the woman may hesitate to deprive 
the children of his companionship, even at substantial danger to herself. 
Though her lawyers perceived a danger to the children, Denise was adamant that Robert's 
danger, sexually, to Lily was over because it was now out in the open. 
98. This is the actual word Denise used to describe the abuse. The use of this clinical 
term seemed to distance Denise from the actuality of what happened and minimize the harm 
to Lily. It is common for mothers whose daughters are abused by their fathers to have diffi­
culty either believing that the abuse happened at all or that it cannot be dealt with by the 
family. In her groundbreaking book on incest, Dr. Judith Herman writes of the experiences 
of forty women incest survivors: 
Those daughters who did confide in their mothers were uniformly disappointed in their 
mothers' responses. Most of the mothers, even when made aware of the situation, were 
unwilling or unable to defend their daughters. They were too frightened or too depen­
dent upon their husbands to risk a confrontation. Either they refused to believe their 
daughters, or they believed them but took no action. 
JUDITii LEWIS HERMAN Wl1li LISA HmsCHMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 89 (1981). 
However, it is important to beware of blaming powerless mothers for the heinous behavior of 
abusive fathers. We need heightened awareness of the complex and often violent reality of 
women who are unable to protect their children from the violence of abusive men. See Marie 
Ashe, "Bad Mothers," "Good Lawyers," and "Legal Ethics," 81 GEO. L.J. 2533 (1993). 
99. Denise also told Alisa that she had been molested when she was a girl. That molesta­
tion also stopped when the man (a relative, not her father) tried to have intercourse with 
Denise, she refused and told her mother. Subsequently the abuse stopped, but nothing more 
was done. Bass and Davis note that abuse patterns tend to be repeated. 
If the abuse took place within your own family, or if your family did not protect and 
support you, you grew up in a dysfunctional family . • • .  Until you actively face your 
abuse and begin to heal from it, you are likely to repeat the same kind of parenting you 
had as a child. 
BAss & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 42. 
100. The traditional view is: 
Once a lawyer represents a client, the lawyer has a duty to make his or her expertise 
fully available in the realization of the end sought by the client, irrespective, for the most 
part, of the moral worth to which the end will be put or the character of the client who 
seeks to utilize it. Provided that the end sought is not illegal, the lawyer is, in essence, an 
amoral technician whose peculiar skills and knowledge in respect to the law are available 
to those with whom the relationship of client is established. 
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 5-6 
(1975) (noting the traditional view, and subsequently criticizing it). On the other hand, "a 
lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client may 
wish that the lawyer do so.
,, 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 
(1989). Lawyers are generally free to decline to represent a persons seeking their services 
and may be required to do so if their personal convictions would interfere with representa­
tion. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1989) ("The lawyer's 
own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a cli-
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"Who is the client?"101 Alisa began the interview thinking it was 
Denise. She ended the meeting feeling it was Lily.102 And what 
was Alisa's role to be? She knew she was "the lawyer." She did not 
want to be "the therapist," but in many ways she was put in that 
position.103 She knew that she had a duty to represent her client 
zealously.104 But that duty is tempered by her duty as an officer of 
the court10s and as a person responsible for her own moral 
choices.106 Isn't it? 
The end of the semester provided a facile solution. Alisa devel­
oped a counseling plan. Denise was informed of her options. The 
policy at LAB is generally not to represent in legal separation ac­
tions because they tend to be ongoing and because withdrawal as 
counsel, if there is a reconciliation, requires a court appearance.107 
Alisa did provide Denise with all the paperwork to file a separation 
herself. Denise was also informed of her. option to renew the re­
straining order in the District Court. Finally, if she decided that she 
ent. "). The earlier version of the code stated, more clearly, that "[a] lawyer should not accept 
proffered employment if his personal interests or desires will, or there is a reasonable 
probability that they will, affect adversely the advice to be given or services to be rendered 
the proposed client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-2 (1969). 
101. "The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal 
representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations." 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1989). 
102. This was of course problematic, because Alisa felt that Lily's interests were different 
from Denise's. 
103. Alisa knew that she could discuss with Denise the possibility of seeking supportive, 
emotional counseling with another professional. 
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another 
profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of 
psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work . . . . Where consultation with a profes­
sional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the 
lawyer should make such a recommendation. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 cmt. (1989); see also Peter Margulies, 
"Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues 
and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990). 
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 2.1 cmt. (1989) ("The advo­
cate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause . . . . The 
law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may 
proceed."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1982) ("A Lawyer 
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."). 
105. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT pmbl. (1989) ("A lawyer is a repre­
sentative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsi­
bility for the quality of justice."). 
106. See Paul Lowell Haines, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Tzme for Judicial 
Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445, 448 (1990) (discussing the view of critics of the adversary sys­
tem that the adversary system creates an environment where victory is more valued than 
justice by subordinating the importance of "truth" to other less important ideals, emphasizing 
legal autonomy while discounting moral autonomy, and de-emphasizing the importance of 
what is morally right.). 
107. See MAss. SUP. JUD. Cr. R. 3:07, DR 2-110 (1996). 
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wanted to proceed with a divorce, LAB would hold her file open 
for some months to give her time to decide. 
With the most fastidious ethical positioning, Alisa and I avoided 
the ethical issues. We were oblivious to our not-so-subtle use of 
lawyer power to take the "client" out of "client-centered lawyer­
ing. "108 If Denise had started the interview by saying that Robert 
was a rat, that she wanted a divorce and a restraining order, we 
would have been at her side.109 We would have been a team. In­
stead, when she articulated a clear goal, legal separation working 
toward reconciliation-we said, sorry, we cannot help, except to 
give you some court forms.110 
Her lawyers did not ask the hard questions. The initial inter­
view lasted almost three hours. The subsequent meeting, which I 
attended, lasted two hours. Yet neither Alisa nor I asked Denise 
why she wanted to work toward reconciliation. We did not ask her 
whether she thought Robert and Lily could ever live in the same 
house again. We did not ask her open questions, such as, "What are 
your concerns? What troubles you?" 
For Denise and for her lawyers, the traditional interview model 
did not work. The model failed to recognize the important interre­
lationship between articulation of a narrative and understanding of 
a goal.111 Denise was asked for a goal when her narrative was still 
tenuous. She had committed fifteen years of her life to Robert. 
She had two children, whom she loved very much, with Robert. 
She was reluctant and embarrassed to talk about Robert's violence 
108. In his study of poverty lawyers, Carl J. Hosticka concluded that the lawyers exer­
cised almost exclusive control over how the client's problem was to be defined and what was 
to be done about it. The lawyers did this without consciousness of their power by manipulat­
ing the paralinguistic aspects of the client interactions, including floor control, topic control, 
and question control. See Hosticka, supra note 6, at 599 (study of fifty interactions between 
clients and lawyers in legal services office). 
109. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 20 ("When women tell the stories of their commit­
ment to relationships, stories which may include love and hope, the legal system often has no 
way to hear them." (citations omitted)). Alisa and I were definitely part of the "legal sys­
tem" at this point in the case. 
110. The power of preordained lawyer solutions continues to amaze me. After the inter­
view, we were surprised that Denise did not want a divorce. It was not until I was writing this 
article, and for the first time in a long time reviewing the original intake sheet, that I realized 
that Denise, from the beginning, had indicated her hope for reconciliation. Alisa and I un­
consciously had screened out the information from the intake sheet that was inconsistent 
with the way we, the lawyers, wanted to see the problem. 
111. See Linda F. Smith, Interviewing Clients: A Linguistic Comparison of the "Tradi­
tional" Interview and the "Client-Centered" Interview, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 541, 574 (1995) 
(noting that for many of the clients studied, it "may be inappropriate and unnecessary" for 
the client to state their goal at the outset of their meeting with an attorney. For many clients, 
their goals "made more sense after the story was told; and the strongest demands seemed 
more justifiable once one understood everything that happened"). 
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toward her. Not surprisingly, it was not until the second meeting 
that his pattern of violence emerged.112 The reality of Robert's 
rape of Lily, even though a year had passed, was not integrated into 
Denise's narrative. She articulated the facts - almost clinically. 
She had not yet positioned herself and others in relationship to the 
facts. What seemed to Alisa and me as callused and uncaring be­
havior toward Lily, was part of Denise's long process of making 
choices about how to structure her past and future. 
There is a difference between speaking and writing. The 
speaker sees her audience. Who is listening and how they listen 
affect the ability of the speaker to talk. There is an interaction be­
tween speaker and listener.113 In a symbiotic way they can work 
together for deeper levels of understanding.114 In the first meetings 
with Denise, symbiosis did not occur. Denise's lawyers wanted one 
story; the straightforward story of abuse and legal solutions. Denise 
lived a much more complicated life. Although we tried to adhere to 
professional neutrality, there is now no doubt in my mind that 
Denise clearly perceived our aversion to her initially chosen 
narrative. 
The thing that we, the lawyers, did correctly at the beginning of 
Denise's case was to move slowly and with caution. We did not 
abandon Denise, we did not tell her of our repulsion. We gave her 
some immediate guidance on the restraining order. Most impor­
tantly, we gave her time.115 The irony is that once she adopted our 
chosen road, we stopped developing the case narrative. It was as if 
she had seen the light and we denied her right to a more compli­
cated solution - or maybe to the same solution but from a more 
thorough process. 
C. The Politics of Narrative Control 
Impoverished clients who are ambivalent are exposed to double 
jeopardy. Lawyer interests certainly play an unconscious, if not 
112. Denise was our client for almost a year before Robert's violence toward Eric was 
discussed by Denise. While there were only four or five major instances, one of these inci­
dents was serious enough that Denise called the police. 
113. Professor Roberts observes: "People will choose what to share from their lives de­
pending on how they feel they are being heard and how they see others being listened to." 
ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 9. 
114. See Cunningham, supra note 30, at 2473 ("Yet the lawyer's work for a client cannot 
be limited to mere representation. New meaning is given to the "reality' the client brings to 
the lawyer and in some way that "reality' is altered."). 
115. This was crucial. If we had closed her case, given the great demand for LAB's serv­
ices, there was a real possibility that we would not have taken Denise's case if she reapplied 
for services. See supra notes 6-7. 
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conscious, role in case selection.116 The poor client is in jeopardy 
that the free lawyers will reject her outright by declining to repre­
sent a troublesome, time-consuming client who does not really 
know what she wants. The poor client also risks losing her ability to 
receive free representation if she does not seize the opportunity 
when offered.117 
Lawyer power operates to control not only what story is heard 
in court, 11s but also what story is ever known. In the clinical law 
literature, two important perspectives have developed about the 
role of the client's "story." In truly groundbreaking analysis, 
Professors Anthony Alfieri,119  Stephen Ellmann,12o Phyllis 
Goldfarb,121 Gerald Lopez, 122 Lucie White,123 and others, have 
worked to develop a theoretics of practice.124 Based on literature 
about professional control of client interactions, 125 they challenge 
lawyers, particularly those representing disempowered, or "out­
sider," clients to be truly client-centered by bringing the client's re­
ality into the actual lawyering of the case.126 The theoretics-of-
116. See Alfieri, supra note 6, at 2124 n.69 ("Classifying clients in terms of perceived 
dependence shuns clients who decline to participate in the approved lawyer-client ritual of 
manufacturing dependency."). 
117. See Tremblay, supra note 96, at 960-61 ("[I]t is important to note that the resource 
allocation questions with which medicine struggles are much more unavoidable in the context 
of poverty law than in the area of private lawyering. The relatively and visibly finite re­
sources available to address the vast array of legal problems facing individuals who cannot 
pay for legal services requires that allocation decisions be made all the time, even if the 
decisionmakers do not realize that they are doing so."). 
118. See White, supra note 20 (stating that often attorneys frame poor people's claims in 
a way irrelevant to them because attorneys are more worried about choosing their plaintiffs 
strategically, about how the client's "story " will look to the court, and about how closely it 
will comply with a fact pattern that will compel the desired legal remedy); see also supra note 
30. 
119. See Alfieri, supra note 6; Anthony Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of 
Josephine V., 4 GEo. J. LEGAL Ennes 619 (1991); Anthony Alfieri, The Antinomies of Pov­
erty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 
(1987-88). 
120. See Ellmann, supra note 25; Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS 
L.J. 991 (1992). 
121. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective 011 
Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 3. 
122. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S V1s10N OF PRO· 
GRESSIVE LAW PRAcriCE (1992); L6pez, supra note 88. 
123. See White, supra note 30; Lucie White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyer· 
ing for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 861 (1990); White, supra note 20. 
124. See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. 
REv.1731, 1748-50 (1993) (describing theoretics of practice); Symposium, Theoretics of Prac· 
tice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992). 
125. See Smith, supra note 111, at 544 (detailing the use of language for professional 
control). 
126. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 66, at 485-87 (emphasizing the need to integrate client 
narrative into the construction of case theory). 
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practice scholars argued, first, that to recognize the theory that nar­
rative allowed oppressed persons a way to express themselves in the 
dominant society127 and, second, that to take client narrative into 
the real-world arenas of administrative hearings and court proceed­
ings. The movement aimed at a transformation of legal discourse 
from the "bottom up."12s 
Critique of this new approach has challenged the practicality 
and, frankly, elitism of the theoretics-of-practice reform.129 In par­
ticular, there is a concern that poor clients are no different than rich 
clients. They come to lawyers for outcomes.130 Professor Cathy 
Lesser Mansfield writes in critiquing theoretics of practice: 
Undoubtedly, each client's whole story, in the client's own words and 
with the client's individual nuances, was relevant to an attempt at ho­
listic knowledge of the client, or an understanding of the client's nor­
mative context. But neither Ellen Smith nor the Bakers [clients she 
represented] sought my help because they wanted me to know and 
understand every aspect of the normative reality of their lives. The 
Bakers came to see me because they did not want to be homeless. 
Ellen Smith came to see me because she did not want her daughter to 
be hit anymore.131 
Certainly, Denise came to see me because she did not want her 
daughter to be sexually molested again. She wanted a separation. 
What is more complicated is how these goals fit in with the host of 
Denise's other goals. I could not recognize these goals, however, 
until I had a much fuller contextual understanding of the case; in 
fact, I am still learning about many of Denise's goals as I continue 
to contemplate the complexity of her life. For example, despite 
Denise's clearly stated push and pull feelings about Robert, we 
never really explored Lily's desires regarding contact with her fa-
127. See supra notes 71-74; see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grenas: 
Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 11 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 210-15 (1994) (stating that outsider storytelling is a discursive technique 
for resisting cultural and linguistic domination through personal and collective redefinition); 
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal 
Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAw & INEQ. J. 103, 106 n.6 (1987) (recognizing the double 
bind of understanding and using the term "white man," since in order to criticize those in that 
category, one inevitably engages in discourse steeped in "Eurocentric thought processes "). 
128. Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RE.v. 323, 324-26 (1987) (arguing that legal discourse from the bottom, 
from minorities, offers a new perspective). 
129. See cathy Lesser Mansfield, Deconstructing Reconstructive Poverty Law: Practice­
Based Critique of the Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Practice Movement, 61 BROOK. 
L. RE.v. 889, 891-93 (1995); Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education 
and Scholarship, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1191 (1992). 
130. See Mansfield, supra note 129, at 897 ("[P]overty clients come to see poverty lawyers 
to obtain a certain result."). 
131. Id. at 893. 
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ther. We assumed that she would want no contact. We gave lip 
service to, but never really explored with Denise, the possibilities 
other than a blanket, permanent restraining order. Would Denise 
and Lily have wanted supervised visits, or even unsupervised visits 
in public places? We really did not ask about Robert's continuing 
threat at all. And while we were so quick to believe that lawyers 
are not therapists, we were equally quick to assume that the right 
course for Lily's mental health was to have no contact.132 To be 
honest, we were caught up in our concern - almost disgust - that 
Denise did not seem outraged by Robert's behavior toward Lily. 
Denise always seemed more concerned about her own loss of Rob­
ert. We were also torn by the tough ethical questions, none of 
which could be resolved comfortably. 
For clients' stories to be powerful in transforming law, they must 
have a safe place to develop.133 A major role of the lawyer in cases 
involving trauma may be to allow a client's voice to claim its place 
in the courtroom. But how can that be possible if the lawyer never 
gives the client the space, power, and authority to develop the nar­
rative of the client's choice in the office?134 
Likewise, for disempowered client outsiders, a focus on out­
comes may be a focus on lawyer outcomes only. How can lawyers 
expect women who have survived trauma to be adept at articulating 
realities that they have yet to imagine? 
132. See Ellman, supra note 25, at 2700 n.100 ("Lawyers are not therapists and are un­
likely to have either the skill or the opportunity for an attempt at therapeutic intervention 
into their clients' psyches. What they cannot do well, they generally ought not to attempt. 
Important as this caution is, however, it should not be overstated. Developing a bond with 
another person is not a function reserved to experts; rather, it is a major part of the stuff of 
everyday life. In addition, the clinical legal education movement's focus on training students 
in the skills of interviewing and counseling suggests that law students have the capacity to 
practice and refine techniques that enhance their ability to connect with their clients. The 
caring lawyer, recognizing the desirability of building such relationships, should - and can 
- work to improve her ability to do so."). 
133. See Lenore E. Walker, A Response to Elizabeth M. Schneider's Describing and 
Changing: Women's Self Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 223, 223-24 (1986) ("There is a fundamental difference between the 
way women tell of their battering experiences and what is permitted under the male­
identified rules of evidence. Women tend to tell of the events in question rooted in their 
context, by weaving a tale of patterns of events and feelings in the context of how they 
happened."). 
134. Professor Smith observes: 
Much more study of inexperienced and experienced attorneys conducting "client­
centered" interviews is needed in order to understand the kinds of questioning that may 
be appropriate and useful during an initial meeting. In the meantime, we should not 
require or expect our students to conduct linear, logical, theory-driven questioning. We 
should also encourage questioning driven by creative, exploratory thinking so long as it 
is sensitive to the client's concerns and related to the problem presented. 
Smith, supra note 111, at 580. 
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Domestic cases involving traumatic family histories are different 
than cases involving, say, consumer fraud. Likewise, not all domes­
tic abuse cases involve ambivalent clients whose understanding of 
their lives and what they want is still developing. Additionally, 
some consumer fraud cases are fraught with the kind of empower­
ment issues that require careful and creative fact development, case 
strategy, and goal assessment. Lawyering needs to be contextual to 
the client and the case. 
The difficulty of denying· the empowering interplay of cautious 
and fluid client narrative development is that some cases that seem 
simple to the lawyer really do involve complicated decisionmaking. 
This is particularly true where the cultural and ethnic backgrounds 
of the clients are di:fferent.135 It is much harder to pick up clues 
from the initial client contact.136 The lawyer must listen with care 
and without judgment. 
II. RACE AS PRAXIS, RACE AS REALITY 
A. Context and Experience: Race Matters 
Before unpacking my thoughts onto a computer screen, I spoke 
with Denise and asked her permission to write about her case.137 I 
told her that I thought a lot about her case and our lawyering of it. 
She assured me that all of her student lawyers were great and that 
she never could have gotten through the court system by herself.138 
I thanked her and agreed that her student attorneys were thorough, 
responsible, and excellent advocates.139 I then explained that I 
could only write about her case and her experiences from my per-
135. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: To­
wards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298, 1299 {1992) (explain­
ing the difficulty of listening to "the other" and of both recognizing the difference of "the 
other" and of expanding one's own imagination to have some understanding of "the other's" 
story.). 
136. Cultural factors not only include gender, race, and ethnicity, but also social categori­
zations such as disability and sexual preference. See, e.g., GREENSPAN, supra note 33, at 271-
72 {chronicling that through use of narrative therapy, a woman therapy patient "restoried" 
her life. She originally saw her lesbianism as a weakness but ended therapy by seeing her 
lesbianism as a strength); Diane Clare & Hildegard Grant, Sexual-Abuse Therapy and Recov­
ery Group (STR): A New Zealand Program using Narrative Therapy for Women Survivors of 
Childhood Sexual Abuse who are Intellectually Disabled, 22 DEv. DrsABIUTIES BuLI .. 80 
{1994). 
137. I assured Denise that all the names and identifying characteristics would be changed. 
138. See White, supra note 20, at 542-43 (discussing the "clash of cultures" between the 
community of poor people and the courts resulting in a fear of pursuing their rights in court). 
139. See L6pez, supra note 88, at 1656-57 (explaining that lawyering may by "brilliant and 
thorough" while at the same time counterproductive and disempowering). 
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spective.140 I hoped, I said, that by telling the clinical teacher's 
story I might see some ways that I could help my students be better 
lawyers and help myself be a better teacher.141 
We spent some time catching up on each others lives. She said 
that it was great to be off welfare and working full time. I talked 
about LAB, plans for the summer, changes in the neighborhood. I 
paused. "Denise," I said, "as I have been thinking about everything 
that happened over the last two years, all the meetings, all the court 
dates, all the discussions, I was particularly struck how we never 
mentioned race - at all." "Race was not really an issue," Denise 
responded. I waited a moment. Denise then puzzled, "Well, it was 
not really an issue between Robert and me.142 It was an issue with 
the children." I waited. She then began talking about how the kids 
were mixed race, but really Black.143 They think of themselves as 
140. I told Denise that it was likely that my description of her case would only be some­
what recognizable to her. I saw only the thinnest slice of her life - and I saw that only 
through my interest as the supervisor of her student lawyers, or from the times during the 
summer that I acted directly as her lawyer. See Harrison & Montoya, supra note 1, at 27 
(noting the need to question "the ability of one person to speak for another, particularly 
when the speaker is situated within the hierarchical structures of the academy or the legal 
system, and is speaking about persons who do not share the speaker's characteristics of race, 
class, sexual orientation, gender, language, or nationality."). 
141. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1672-73 (importance of critique for better education). 
142. Denise and Robert began their relationship in the late 1970s in the Boston area. I 
could not help but remember the extreme racial tension in Boston at that time. The busing 
conflict was ongoing. Racial confrontation and violence were everyday news issues. "For 
thousands of families who lived through it, the onset of school busing in Boston was the 
defining experience of a lifetime. No other event in the postwar history of the city's neigh­
borhoods engendered as much fear, as much soul-searching or as much righteousness." 
Michael Rezendes, How Class Fueled the Boston Busing Crisis, Book Review of Boston 
Against Busing, Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 
1991, at A17; see also J . .ANmoNY LuKAs, COMMON GROUND (1986); Boston in Turmoil: 
Uncommon Time, 16 YALE REv. 62, 62-73 (1986). Boston historically was segregated and 
remains a racially divided city. Denise's comment was also personal to her analysis of her 
intimate relationship. Whether race was "not an issue" for Denise and Robert in the social 
context or in the personal context, to the extent the two can be divided, is a complicated 
question and not one I can answer. For a discussion of white opposition to interracial rela­
tionships, see OUVER C. Cox, CASTE, CLAss AND RACE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS 
387, 526-27 {1948); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM 
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 58-60 {1964); Isabel Wilkerson, Black-White Marriages Rise, but 
Couples Sdll Face Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1991, at Al. 
143. See Espinoza, supra note 1, at 24-25 {"The politics of dichotomous categorical iden­
tity require individuals to be placed into or to be forced to choose one particular defining 
identity."); Gotanda, supra note 41, at 24 (noting the classification of who is black by a rule of 
recognition or rule of descent-for example, "one-drop" of blood-is inadequate); Sharon 
M. Lee, Racial Classijicadons in the U.S. Census: 1890-1990, 16 ETIINIC & RACIAL STUD. 75 
{1993) (arguing that a belief in "pure" race is reflected in official census data). Controversy 
over census categories continues. See Lynn Norment, Am 1 Black, White or In Between? ls 
there a Plot to Create A "colored" Buffer Race in America?, EBONY, Aug. 1995 (discussing 
politics of the push to categories, and worrying about the current effort to officially dilute 
Black power with mixed race classifications). Census categories are particularly galling for 
Latino/as. See JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN! RACE, COLOR, 
COMMUNITY 99-100 (1995) (American dominant culture has long refused to recognize the 
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Black.144 And of course they are Black . . .  but also mixed race.145 
It has been a challenge for her as the children grow older. There 
are so many issues and problems because they are Black.146 
It was like opening a floodgate. We talked as two women 
amazed at the complexity of a world that the mother and that the 
lawyer wished were simpler, easier for them to understand and 
fairer to live in. When Eric and Lily were in elementary school, 
they were two of a few Blacks at their school.147 They had a mix of 
friends. In middle school things changed. There were seven or 
eight elementary feeder schools to the middle school and there 
were many more Blacks. The Black students grouped together. 
They were segregated.148 Denise paused. She explained, "I under­
stand why Eric and Lily feel like they have to do this. It's just sad 
that everyone is in separate groups. "149 
progeny of interracial sex, indeed the very term "mulatto" comes from the word mule, the 
sterile offspring of a horse and a donkey); Clarence Page, Showing My Color; Biracial Kids 
Face Burden of Two Worlds, Haus. C!moN., Mar. 14, 1996, at Dl, D12 (most Mexicans re­
gard themselves as "mestizo" - part Spanish and part indigenous; mixed race is almost part 
of the official culture in Mexico, and Mexico has not asked the "race" question on its census 
since 1921). 
144. See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, Hos. 
TILE, UNEQUAL ix (1992) ("Dividing people into races started as convenient categories. 
However, those divisions have taken on lives of their own, dominating our culture and con­
sciousness, coloring passions and opinions, contouring facts and fantasies."). 
145. The operation of racism is to eliminate other identities that might alter the power 
structure. See Lee, supra note 143, at 75 (identifying and discussing four themes in U.S. race 
classifications: importance of skin color, belief in "pure" race, role of census categories in 
creating pan-ethnic groups, and the confusion of race and ethnicity classifications). 
146. "It is utterly exhausting being black in America . . . .  While many minority groups 
and women feel similar stress, there is no respite or escape from your badge of color." MAR­
IAN Wrumrr EDELMAN, THE MEASURE OF OUR SUCCESS 23 (1992); see, e.g., MYRDAL, supra 
note 142 (discussing how the "Negro problem" affects all other social, cultural, economic, 
and political problems in America); PATRICIA WILUAMS, T HE  ALCHEMY OF RACE AND 
RIGHTS (1991) (noting that being Black constructs all aspects of life; race affects everything 
from how you are treated at a Benneton store to your educational opportunity to your safety 
on the streets to your sense of self). 
147. Denise did not talk about the isolation and stigmatization I feared her children suf­
fered as two of the sprinkling of Black children used to integrate their elementary school. 
See generally REUBEN M BARON ET AL., SOCIAL CLAss, RACE AND TEACHER EXPECTA­
TIONS, TEACHER EXPECTANCIES 251-69 (1985) (examining research that exposes teachers' 
gross stereotyping as well as their inaccurate, negative, and rigid expectations of black and 
low-income children, and how these expectations are the foundation for self-fulfilling 
prophecies of academic failure). 
148. I believe it is important to recognize that this phenomenon works both ways in a 
racist society; the outsider clings to his or her group for protection and identity, but the 
outsider is also pushed outside by the exclusionist politics of racism. See Espinoza, supra 
note 1, at 25 {"The choice is to assimilate [assuming you can] or to be pushed into some 
distinct category of "other,' whether it fits or not."). 
149. Denise was expressing the pain of a parent whose children do not make the same 
choices. I felt she was also expressing her feelings of exclusion from the world of her chil­
dren. There are pains she cannot protect them from; 11ains she cannot know directly. 
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"But," Denise explained, "it is mostly at school. They both have 
white friends too." But this often is complicated. For example, a 
few months ago Eric was arrested in Framingham. Eric was one of 
five boys who were in town visiting friends. Three of the boys were 
white, two were Black. The police came by and said they were too 
loud. Somehow arrests were made. Only the two African Ameri­
can boys were arrested.150 The police let the three white boys go.151 
The police did not call Denise until 4 a.m. By this time she was 
frantic. Eric is sixteen. He was in an adult holding tank. When 
Denise picked him up, he told her that the police roughed him up 
and would not listen to him when he told them that he was a 
minor.152 
B. Subverting the Dominant Discourse: A Call for Cultural 
Recognition in Client Interactions 
When lawyers are silent about race, we deny that it matters. 
Most of us do not want to be called a racist and do not want to be 
racist. We seek to conduct our human interactions in just and equal 
ways. But how does one accomplish fairness? Is it by treating eve­
ryone the same? 
150. See, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, All in Their Family, THE NATION, July 24, 1989, at 
113, 114 (reporting the alanning statistic that "[t]oday more black men are in jail than in 
college"); Derrick Jackson, The Double Standard on Drug Crimes, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 
1996, at A19 ("The result is that African-Americans, 13 percent of the drug users, make up 
35 percent of the arrests, 55 percent of the convictions and 74 percent of the sentences for 
drug charges. African-Americans and Latinos make up 90 percent of those sentenced on 
drug possession in state courts. Affinnative action may be out for jobs but very in for jails."). 
151. Black males are perceived to be threatening by their very presence. 
The image of the criminal black is one many whites are introduced to, not through indi­
vidual experience, but rather through the media. Indeed, given the fact that most as­
pects of life such as neighborhoods and schools are still highly segregated . • .  the only 
sustained contact that whites and blacks have is through the media. Therefore, the me­
dia plays an important role in the construction of a national image of the criminal (trans­
gressing) black. . . . It is the image of the dangerous black criminal that apparently 
convinced jurors in the Rodney King case that it was Officer Laurence Powell, not 
Rodney King, whose life was threatened in the encounter between the two. This, despite 
the video showing that Powell continued brutally to beat King on the head (about thirty 
times) after it was clear that he could have arrested him without any resistance. 
Adeno Addis, Recycling in Hell, 61 TUI .. L. REV. 2253, 2264 (1993). 
152. It is common that black males are stopped by the police, not listened to, and not 
believed. See, e.g., Wcsr, supra note 40, at x-xi (remembering "[u]gly racial memories" of 
being stopped while driving and falsely accused of drug trafficking and being mocked when 
he said he was a professor; of being stopped three times in ten days for "driving too slow" in 
a residential area of Princeton; and of his fifteen-year-old son having similar experiences); 
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Notes from California: Rodney King and the Race Question, 70 
DENV. U. L. REv. 199, 201 (1993) (relating the story of a large Black male student, stopped 
by the university police while crossing campus and arrested, despite showing his student iden­
tification card, when he became angry for being stopped). 
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Feminists have recognized the problem with "sameness" equal­
ity.153 Equality under this theory means that women are treated the 
same as men. Unfortunately this approach often perpetuates dis­
crimination. The standard by which men and women are to be 
measured is one defined by men and established with men in 
mind.154 Further, "sameness" equality fails to recognize the lived 
reality of the disparity of power between men and women. Most 
importantly, "sameness" equality denies the valuable differences 
women have and wish to retain.155 
Racial justice has traditionally used the rubric of "sameness."156 
At times, the "sameness" was about "separate, but equal." Now it 
is about "colorblindness." Colorblindness has become the prevail­
ing understanding of racial equality1s7 - whether we are discussing 
access to education and jobs, or whether we are discussing how we 
treat each other in individual encounters. Conceptually, colorblind­
ness has all of the difficulties of gender sameness.158 Racial outsid­
ers are measured against a standard that is defined by whites.159 
153. See CATHARINE A. MAcl<INNoN, Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODI­
FIED 32-45 (1987). 
154. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engen­
dered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10 (1987). 
155. See, e.g., Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CAR­
oozo L. REv. 37 (1988) (discussing the value of emotion and empathy in decisiorunaking); 
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1988). 
156. Racism and sexism cannot be equated. This article is not an effort to do so. How­
ever, a comparison of the distortion of the concept of "equality" in both systems of oppres­
sion unmasks their similar hierarchical ends. See Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: 
Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365, 372-74 {discussing 
the limitations of both a race-sex correspondence or independence); Trina Grillo & Stepha­
nie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Compari­
sons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-Isms), 1991 DuKE L.J. 397. This article is an 
epistemological endeavor, not a political project to see which oppression "trumps" the other. 
157. See Culp, supra note 41, at 163. 
158. Professor Mcintosh writes: 
Thinking through unacknowledged male privilege as a phenomenon with a life of its 
own, I realized that since hierarchies in our society are interlocking, there was most 
likely a phenomenon of white privilege that was similarly denied and protected, but alive 
and real in its effects . . . •  I have come to see white privilege as an invisible package of 
unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was "meant' 
to remain oblivious. 
Peggy Mcintosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See 
Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A 
ClvIL RIGHrS READER 22-23 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995). 
159. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and 
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 973 (1993) ("Thus whites 
rely on primarily white referents in formulating the norms and expectations that become 
criteria of decision for white decisionmakers. Given whites' tendency not to be aware of 
whiteness, it's unlikely that white decisiorunakers do not similarly misidentify as race-neutral 
personal characteristics, traits, and behaviors that are in fact closely associated with 
whiteness."). 
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The defining system of white advantage, white privilege, is invisible. 
To be colorblind is to force assimilation to the standard of 
whiteness.160 
Racism is resilient because of its ability, as a system of oppres­
sion, to "hide its horns. "161 The power of colorblindness is that it 
makes us feel that we are being fair. It becomes the standard for 
behavior. We focus on the process of justice - Blacks and whites 
took the same test,162 the voting districts were historically and geo­
graphically drawn,163 and so on. Colorblindness hides the actual ex­
clusion and suppression of outsiders.164 
Too often those desirous of racial justice adopt and defend poli­
cies that lure them into the quick fix. Colorblindness is an easy 
approach - until one thinks about it. To be colorblind assumes 
that one notices race, but then "chooses" not to notice it and does 
so without the first noticing influencing the interaction.165 This is a 
denial of the fundamental process of cognition. One must assume 
the nonexistence of unconscious racism and the ability not to mask 
conscious racism.166 Colorblindness is conceptually ludicrous in 
this very raced society. But there is no humor in this twisted policy; 
racial justice is too painfully important. 
160. See generally RUTii FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MA.TIERS: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: 
How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as 
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993). 
161. Karl Marx is reputed to have identified the ability of capitalism to "hide its horns" 
and thus make its oppression invisible. 
162. One of the most pernicious examples of white-based cultural measures are standard­
ized tests. See Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & 
L. 121, 122 n.8, 126 n.32 (1993) (discussing test bias, the LSAT's unproved correlation to 
success, and the myth of predictive precision); see also STEPHEN J. GouLD, THE Mis. 
MEASURE OF MAN 146-234 (1981) (describing the long-documented bias of the Stanford­
Binet IQ exam and other intelligence tests). 
163. In Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), the Court struck down redistricting in North 
Carolina that would have provided for a few Black majority districts, noting that the plaintiffs 
who challenged the redistricting plan were seeking "to participate in a "color-blind' electoral 
process." 113 s. a. at 2824. 
164. See Culp, supra note 41, at 173-75 (discussing and critiquing the "sacrosanct" deci­
sion of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), by noting that the real ability of interracial 
couples to exist was not addressed). 
165. See Gotanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
166. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE LJ. 1559, 1560 (1989) ("The 
claim of pervasive, unconscious racism is easily devalued. The charge has come to be seen as 
egregious defamation and to carry an aura of irresponsibility. Nonetheless, the claim is well 
founded.") (citation omitted); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec­
tion: Reckoning with .Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318 (1987) ("We were all 
victims of our culture's racism. We had all grown up on Little Black Sambo and Amos and 
Andy."). 
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Colorblind lawyering did not serve Denise, Lily, or Eric well.161 
In sorting out this family's life through the legal process, race was 
important. Denise loves her children. She does not want to be seg­
regated from them physically or psychologically. But she is. Lily 
and Eric will have very different life experiences than Denise.168 
Their experiences are complex and dynamic. In the same way that 
Denise "storys" herself individually and within a social context, so 
do Lily and Eric. We cannot construct ourselves or our children 
"just as we please."169 Lily and Eric are caught in a tangle of social 
oppressions and stigmas. Denise could try to raise Lily and Eric to 
think white, dress white, talk white, and act white,11° but they still 
must go out in a world that treats them as Black because they physi­
cally look Black.171 Likewise, Denise could try to raise Lily and 
Eric as mixed race. However, American society does not recognize 
"mixed" racial and ethnic categories.172 The possibilities of parent­
ing are limited by the social reality.113 
167. See Earlene Baggett, Cross-Cultural Counseling, 18 CREIGIITON L. REv. 1475, 1477 
(1985) ("Therefore, to understand adequately any significant cultural problems and influ­
ences that their cross-cultural clients are experiencing, attorneys must rely on knowledge 
previously obtained about a particular minority culture and variations within it. In many 
cases, attorneys will have gained this 'knowledge' primarily from stereotypes endorsed by 
and embedded in the dominant culture and conjecture . . . .  [R]eliance on knowledge derived 
in this way can create barriers to effective legal counseling and can cause other serious 
problems."). 
168. "Being Black or White affects every element of individual existence including access 
to jobs, education, housing, food, and even life or death." ROBERT STAPLES, INTRooucnoN 
TO BLACK SOCIOLOGY 250 (1976). 
169. Fish, supra note 35, at 230 (citation omitted). 
170. Denise never discussed her Jewishness with us, and we did not ask. Racial and cul­
tural inquiries seemed taboo, whether asking about Black identity or Jewish identity, regard­
less of whether Jewishness is defined as religion, ethnicity, or race. 
171. Professor Gotanda explains: 
American racial classifications follow two formal rules: 
1) Rule of recognition: Any person whose Black-African ancestry is visible is Black. 
2) Rule of descent: (a) Any person with a known trace of African ancestry is Black, 
notwithstanding that person's visual appearance; or, stated differently, (b) the off­
spring of a Black and a white is Black. 
Gotanda, supra note 41, at 24. 
172. See id. at 25 (noting failure of legal system to acknowledge intermediate, "mixed" 
racial categories). 
173. Many of these issues are raised in the debate regarding transracial adoption. For an 
excellent discussion reviewing the literature and arguing that studies of children who have 
been transracially adopted are at odds in that the data seem to indicate good adjustment but 
the recommendations are for race conscious adoption, and thus it is too early to draw conclu­
sions about the long-term effect oftransracial adoption on Black children, see 1\vila L. Perry, 
The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33, 37 (1993-94). Compare Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do 
Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163 
{1991) (tracing the history of transracial adoption in the U.S. and arguing that the needs of 
minority children are better served by transracial adoption than by strict race-matching poli­
cies) with Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Redefining the Transracial Adoption Controversy, 2 DuKE 
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Could Denise raise Lily and Eric as African Americans?174 
How could she do this?175 She could try to develop her own bridge 
between cultures. She could reach out to the African American 
community. She could choose a Black church.176 She could de­
velop cultural ties.177 But Denise would have to consciously work 
at building and maintaining a bridge.11s 
It would have been bad lawyering not to ask Denise if she and 
Lily had considered supportive psychotherapeutic counseling.179 
Why was it not bad lawyering to not ask about support for issues of 
identity?1so We left it for the therapists to wonder how Lily felt. 
Lily did receive therapy for a while. As lawyers, we asked her 
mother about it. Denise assured us that Lily had therapy, as did 
Denise, in early 1994. We encouraged Denise to consider whether 
she and Lily might need further therapy. We carefully mapped our 
language when raising this issue in counseling sessions. Did they 
have someone to talk to about all that had happened? Many of our 
J. GENDER L. & POLY. 131 (1995) (arguing that transracial adoption primarily benefits white 
adults seeking to adopt and does not adequately consider interest of Black children). 
174. This is particularly problematic because of the unconscious racial cues in our society. 
See DARLENE POWELL HOPSON & DEREK s. HOPSON, DIFFERENT AND WONDERFUL: RAIS· 
ING BLACK CmLDREN IN A RACE-CONSCIOUS SOCIETY (1990) (noting the imperative of dis­
cussing race in order to promote healthy psychological and emotional development); Perry, 
supra note 173, at 61-65 (noting the importance of "survival skills"); Alvin F. Poussaint & 
James P. Comer, The Question Every Black Parent Asks: What Shall I Tell My Child?, 
REDBOOK, Jan. 1971, at 111-13. 
175. See Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58 TRANsmoN 4, 30-31 
(1991) ("What joins me to other blacks, then, and other blacks to another, is not a set of 
shared physical characteristics, for there is none that all blacks share. Rather, it is the shared 
experience of being visually or cognitively identified as black by a white racist society, and the 
punitive and damaging effects of that identification."). 
176. Choosing a Black, or well integrated, synagogue would be more challenging. 
177. Professor West argues: 
[T]he major enemy of black survival in America has been and is neither oppression nor 
exploitation but rather the nihilistic threat - that is, loss of hope and absence of mean­
ing . . . .  The genius of our black foremothers and forefathers was to create powerful 
buffers to ward off the nihilistic threat, to equip black folk with cultural armor to beat 
back the demons of hopelessness, meaninglessness, and lovelessness. 
WESr, supra note 40, at 15. 
178. bell hooks reininds us: 
[S]ubject to subject contact between white and black which signals the absence of domi­
nation, of an oppressor/oppressed relationship, must emerge through mutual choice and 
negotiation . . . •  [S]imply by expressing their desire for "intimate' contact with black 
people, white people do not eradicate the politics of racial domination as they are made 
manifest in personal interaction. 
BELL HOOKS, BLACK LooKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION 28 (1992). 
179. See supra note 103 (noting the appropriateness, and perhaps duty, of lawyers to 
make referrals to other professionals). 
180. For example, the psychotherapeutic literature has recognized the need for culturally 
appropriate counseling. See Clemont E. Vontress, Racial and Ethnic Barriers in Counseling, 
in COUNSELING ACROSS CULTURES 42 (Paul Pedersen et al. eds., 1976); UNDERSTANDING 
AND COUNSELING ETIINic MINoRmES (George Henderson ed., 1979). 
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other clients who had similar experiences found it useful to have 
some support, to have someone to talk to. We gave Denise lists of 
referral resources. Denise assured us that neither Lily nor she has 
felt more counseling is necessary. We, the lawyers, left it at that. 
I thought I knew a lot about Eric and Lily. Denise discussed 
them with the succession of student attorneys and with me. But we 
never met Eric and Lily. Denise's attorneys never talked directly to 
them about what relationship they would want with their father. It 
did not seem necessary.181 We knew that Robert had occasionally 
physically assaulted Eric; we knew he had raped Lily. But we did 
not know what the children's positive ties to Robert were. And to 
be honest, it made our job easier to demonize him. How much 
more difficult for Eric and Lily to demonize him. Robert is their 
father. He is also the link for Eric and Lily to their racial identity. 
What was it like for Eric and Lily to have to sort out their identity, 
their multi-ident�ties, in the context of this fractured family? 
Should Denise, a white mother of black-multiracial children, have 
considered the need for racial identity as a factor in sorting out fu­
ture contact with Robert?1s2 Should I, her lawyer, have counseled 
her about the importance of racial identity? There are a number of 
ways we could have approached a discussion of race. Do the chil­
dren have support - have you considered big brother-big sister 
programs, ties to other community groups?183 We could have used 
many of the language planning tools we use to address other sensi­
tive counseling issues. But we did not. 
As I began writing this article, and as I worked on it over time, I 
wanted to talk to Denise more about race. I wanted to know if she 
lived in the same community, if her friends had changed. I wanted 
to know if the children had ties to the African American commu­
nity that would help them navigate a world where race matters -
all the time. I wanted to know if the children interacted with their 
father's family. But I did not know enough about the past to war-
181. See Lee M. Robinson, The View from the Minors, 82 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 74, 75-
76 (discussing the importance of listening to and including children's views, particularly of 
the lawyering/legal process, in domestic relations cases). 
182. Eric and Lily have identities that do not fit into neat categories. Like women of 
color, they straddle boundaries and will be challenged by the complexity of their identities. 
Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 46, at 162 (noting that for white women, feminism was the develop­
ment of a consciousness distinct from and in opposition to w1'ite men, but "the racial context 
in which Black women find themselves makes the creation of a political consciousness that is 
oppositional to Black men difficult"). 
183. Obviously, there must be a well-developed client relationship before · a lawyer 
broaches the subject of intrafamily race relations. Cf. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 
90, at 264 ("Skillful use of advanced empathy requires not only insight but also caution."). 
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rant examination of the present. The "case" was over. Denise had 
her divorce; she had her restraining order; Robert could not visit 
the children, he had to stay away from them. Denise asked if she 
could see the article when it was finished. I said, "of course." We 
wished each other well and said good-bye. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1994 Lily had a conversation with her mother. It was a coura­
geous assertion of self-preservation. It forced acknowledgment of 
forced sexual contact, of rape by her father, of forced incest. That 
conversation precipitated the long, slow progression of events that 
culminated in a divorce and permanent restraining order. It imme­
diately forced a confrontation with her father and, despite her 
mother's and her own ambivalence, his expulsion from the home. 
As lawyers, is it our role to wonder how Lily's understanding of 
these events is affected by her mother's understanding. How much 
do we have to learn about Lily's life? Do we need to understand 
how Lily's life is affected by her mother's legal decisions? 
Denise's lawyers were well intentioned. No one knows that bet­
ter than I. However, the complexity of Denise's case challenged 
our "usual" lawyering. We needed to engage in contextual lawyer­
ing. We needed to examine our judgmental response to Denise's 
attachment to Robert. We needed to allow her to make her choices 
in her time. We should have developed a relationship, through 
Denise, with Lily and Eric. And we should have engaged in a dis­
course about racial identity.184 This discourse would be pursued 
only after development of the client relationship and only if consid­
ered contextually appropriate. Such counseling would have had to 
be carefully planned and cautiously implemented. We needed to 
abandon comfortable colorblindness and grapple with the reality of 
the lives of Denise, Lily, and Eric. 
Had we engaged in race-sensitive representation, I believe that 
the outcome of this case would have been different. This is of 
course speculation based on my assessment of different choices 
Denise might have made. These choices were not discussed as pos­
sibilities because they had not been developed. Her lawyers 
needed to enrich the discussion of her life and creatively design op­
tions that were tailored to meet her desires and address her fears. 
For example, rather than a permanent restraining order against 
184. See Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurispru· 
dential Method, 11 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 7 {1989) (urging the development and use of "mul­
tiple consciousness" in thinking about lawyering practice and theory). 
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Robert, we might have fashioned an order that allowed limited con­
tact in a supportive, protective environment, at the option of 
Denise, Lily, or Eric.iss 
A flexible plan would have left open the option, within the con­
trol of Denise, Lily, or Eric, to engage with Robert. Such engage­
ment might have been in a therapeutic, counseling setting. It might 
have been in combination with Robert's extended family. Or it 
might have been conducted with family friends who are close to 
Robert. My belief is that Denise wanted to talk with Robert about 
Lily and Eric's racial identities and the challenge of being Black in 
America. My worry is that Lily and Eric need to process their rela­
tionship with their father, and explore issues of racial identity, and 
that the blanket, permanent restraining order inhibits them from 
making contact. Indeed, it may inhibit Lily and Eric psychologi­
cally from even exploring if they would want to make contact and 
how that might be effectuated. 
Had we discussed with Denise a permanent restraining order 
with limited contact, she might have said, "No, I do not want any 
contact." The final order in the case might have been the same. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the case would have been different 
because the process of lawyering would have been different. We 
would have talked abo-qt race. A discussion of race would have led 
to other types of referrals regarding Lily and Eric. The lawyers 
would have understood the importance of meeting Lily and Eric. 
Lily and Eric would have been participants. This legal case, this 
divorce, constructed a family story as well as an individual story. 
That story was untold. The individual story and the family story are 
part of a larger cultural story. That story was silenced. Race­
sensitive lawyering would have endeavored to nurture all the sto­
ries, with each overlay leading to renewed understanding and the 
hope of healing the raw horror that is rape, the tragic pain that is 
racism. 
185. Such an order might have read: "The Husband is permanently restrained from con­
tacting the Wife or Children. However, if the Wife or Children desire contact with the Hus­
band, they will contact the Husband and set out a specific plan of contact, including time, 
duration, place and supervision if requested. The Husband will be allowed contact within the 
limits of the specific plan." 
' 
